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**THE
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
OF
THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM**

**BY
Professor MICHAELO HRUSHEVSKY**

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M. Hrushevsky

Price: One Shilling net.

EDITION S.V.U.

**LONDON
1915**

The Historical Evolution of The Ukrainian Problem

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PROF. MICHAELO HRUSHEVSKY


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LA REVUE POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE

By
GEORGE RAFFALOVICH

ENGLISH EDITION PUBLISHED FOR S.V.U.

LONDON

1915



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John and Mary A. Yaremko Foundation

PREFACE BY THE TRANSLATOR

PROFESSOR MICHAELO HRUSHEVSKY, the author of this highly interesting and most pathetic sketch of Ukrainian history, which appeared in the November-December number of *La Revue Politique Internationale*, is well known on the Continent as not only the most authoritative historian of his country and nation, but also as one of those obstinate seekers after historical truths in all the fields that pertain to the Slav Races and the various European nations with which they came into contact. He was in fact, of the Ukrainian Leaders, the one who found it easier to secure adherents in all the many camps into which the Ukrainian nation is unfortunately divided. At the beginning of the war, Professor Hrushevsky was in Lemberg, then went to Vienna and to several neutral countries before he returned to Kiev. He was shortly afterwards arrested and exiled to a little town on the Siberian frontier. This, however, need not be taken as an indication of the future policy of the Russian Government towards the Ukrainians. It is more likely to be a temporary measure taken by the Police Authorities in order to impress certain extremist elements among the Ukrainian Leaders of Russia. After the many and repeated assertions made by the British and French statesmen on the subject of the small nationalities of Europe, it is utterly unconceivable that the great majority of the people in the land of our Slavonic allies should be again thwarted in their earnest endeavour to secure more liberties not only for the Russians themselves, but for the subject races of the whole Empire. All Russian Liberals—with the curious exception of a few so-called Democrats—realize to-day the necessity of facing the Ukrainian problem as soon as the war is over in a sincere, honest and fearless fashion. Whether the reforms

be called Autonomy, Home Rule, Devolution or Local Government, it is obvious from the tone of the Russian Liberal Press that the initial mistake committed by one or two irresponsible statesmen during the first occupation of Galicia was one of the most important causes that led to the sudden Russian retreat and the dissatisfaction among the Uniat Ruthenes (or Ukrainians) of Eastern Galicia. As we all know, there is in Russia a remnant of the ancient Germanophile party which has had its innings unopposed almost ever since Catherine II, the most German of all the Russian rulers. One year's war against Germany has apparently not yet reduced that element to impotence.

At the end of the pamphlet will be found a short bibliography of publications that have appeared within the last year in the English Press. There were also two publications in the French language: one, a small Ukrainian news-sheet doubtless ironically called *intermittent* by its Editor, was so obviously written solely in, and altogether supported by German interests, that it was only interesting to the student in so far as it showed indication of possible doubts on the part of Berlin as to the final issue and as to the possibility of mischievous bargaining after the war. We may rely upon the overwhelming majority of the Russian people to refuse to be hoodwinked. We can therefore hope that the typically Prussian way in which Russia has once or twice behaved towards her small nationalities will be at once and for ever repudiated. Pro-Austrian, the Galicians may have had good causes to remain; pro-German they never were or could be.

Is it not the intention of England and France and presumably also that of the Russian Government, that the world be shown most palpably that brute force does not pay, even if a certain amount of brute force has to be used towards the brute itself?

G. R.

Barnes, *July-August*, 1915.

The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian Problem

The tremendous Continental war which is actually unfolding its surprises before our eyes has, for the first time in modern history, brought into prominence the problem of the Ukraine. For many years, of course, people who had a presentiment of the forthcoming events, attempted to determine the importance which it was necessary to attribute to this question, and what place it was to be given in the Evolution of European politics. The present circumstances have made it a problem of the first importance.

This work was written in the Russian language before the outbreak of war, and was intended for an English periodical which was to devote itself to the problems of the small nationalities. Its publication in Russian has been rendered difficult by the events through which we are passing. I have therefore taken advantage of the hospitality offered me by *La Revue Politique Internationale* and hope thereby that this survey of the historical evolution of the Ukrainian aspirations will help to elucidate a problem which has been ignored too long by public opinion in Europe in spite of its vital importance for the future.

I

General Considerations—The Period of the Kiev State

The history of the Ukrainian question, as it offers itself to us to-day, dates from the middle of the seventeenth century, that is, the time of the great Ukrainian Revolution of 1648, which had

given a glaring publicity to the problem, and caused at the same time the partition of the Ukraine between the Muscovite Empire and the Kingdom of Poland. From that day began the decadence of National Ukrainian life. Yet at the same time one could already observe in the people new aspirations towards the re-establishment of their independence. These aspirations tended to put aside all obstacles which opposed the intellectual, social and political development of the country. They can be traced in the movement now taking place in the Ukrainian provinces of both the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The causes which have determined the more recent phases of this movement have their origin in the past centuries. They are a result not only of the political life of the people, but also of the geographical peculiarities of the territory inhabited by this people, of its situation, its physical nature, and of the conditions in which the colonization of the soil was accomplished.

The country inhabited by the Ukrainians is very vast, very fertile, and well watered. Already, in the days of ancient Greece it was one of its granaries, and the Greeks drew therefrom their larger supply. Later, at the beginning of the modern period, these lands provisioned to a large extent Central and Northern Europe in wheat, cattle, and wood. The country possesses immense natural riches—such as iron, coal, salt and other minerals. It furnishes at the present to Eastern Europe most of its cereals, meat, sugar, salt, iron, mercury, etc.

From the very early times the Ukraine has for various reasons awakened the thirst for conquest in its neighbours. Its situation at the centre of the vast plains that join Central Europe to Central Asia on the broad way which, so far as our memory can stretch, various peoples have always followed, and which served for the exchange of the products of civilization—for the coast of the Black Sea offers an especially favourable road for relations

between west, east, and south—all this made of the Ukraine a land of dreams for each of the neighbouring States, as soon as they thought of any political expansion. This longing was facilitated by the fact that the natural frontiers of the country offer almost nowhere any obstacle of importance to invasion.

Not to go too far back in antiquity it will be enough to recall the attempts made by the Greeks, by Rome, by Byzantium, by the Italian republics of the Middle Ages, then by Poland, Hungary, Turkey, Lithuania and Russia, with a view to occupy the land. For the rest we may leave out the study of the means employed by these nations in their attempt to appropriate this territory or to exploit for their own ends the natural riches of the Ukraine, its commercial highways and its relations with other countries extending beyond the Caucasus, with Mesopotamia, Central Asia, Persia, India and China.

The same tendency is to be found in the minds of the conquerors, marching from east to west, such as the Persians in the time of Darius, the Arabian Califs or the Turks of Central Asia and Turkestan. Each political organization which in turn exercised its sway over Ukrainian territory proceeded in the same fashion. As soon as it acquired a certain amount of power, it sought to extend its possessions or its sphere of influence over the neighbouring territory east or west.

*The Slav migration which drifted towards Ukrainian territory with especial vigour between the sixth and eighth centuries, gave the country to the southern group of Eastern Slavs. It is from them that the real Ukrainians are descended.** These peoples

* The words Ukraine and Ukrainian have only recently been used as signifying all the inhabitants of the Ukraine, and the whole territory inhabited by them. They are now also used to designate the different phases of the historic evolution of this race. We see from the documents we possess that these phases are first

settled in the region of the Middle and Lower Dniepr, the Bug and the Southern Dniester. They also occupied a considerable portion of the Don, from whence they were later driven out, during the ninth and tenth centuries, by the Magyars and the Pazinaks, who expelled them from the shores of the Black Sea. The political and social evolution which followed this period of colonial expansion ended by forming a State in the region of the Dniepr with Kiev as the centre. This became the State of Kiev. As soon as it had shaken off the yoke of the Kazars, the Norman conquerors and the rulers of Byzantium and assimilated new influences from east, north and south, it entered upon a period of intense activity and expansion from the ninth and tenth centuries onward. It sought the command of all the commercial highways of Eastern Europe, and aimed at the extension of its power over the Slav nations of the east and other parts who had migrated to the territory crossed by these great highways. In so doing, Kiev had to combat a serious rival, namely Novgorod, the most northern site of Norman influence, which contained in itself important commercial and political interests. In the early pages of the *Annals of the State of Kiev* (eleventh century) one often perceives a trace of this rivalry from which Kiev always emerged victorious.

found in the twelfth century, and are used for the frontiers of the Ukrainian territory at that period. The events of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries which have made Eastern Ukraine the centre of the national, political and intellectual life of the country have led to the word Ukrainian being applied to the entire nation, in place of the old names of "Little Russians" or "South Russians." These terms themselves had formerly replaced the word "Rusj" (which was also used in the first instance for the Southern Ukrainians), as soon as the name "Rusj" was employed to designate also the inhabitants of Great Russia and the western territory occupied by them. These changes of appellation led to much confusion.

The princes of Kiev—Svjatoslav (died 792), Vladimir the Great (1015), Yaroslav (1054)—founded the hegemony of Kiev and the Ukraine on a solid basis owing to the political system of this State, also called " Russian " State.*

Their possessions extended from the mouth of the Kuban to the San in the west, in the north to the Big Lakes and the tributaries of the Volga. The most important centres of control for these distant regions were Kiev, Tchernicov, and Pereyaslavl. It was here that the political and intellectual activity of Eastern Europe centred at this period. Christianity, brought about by Vladimir the Great in 990, owing to Byzantine influence, became the basis of the new civilization of Kiev, which was modelled on the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the literature and the art of Byzantium. This civilization, together with the Laws of the State of Kiev, made a path for itself through Southern Ukraine towards the north and the east right through the territory named White Russia and Great Russia up to the Finnish region.

This hegemony of the Ukrainian towns in the valley of the Dniepr was not long preserved however. The pressure from the Turks which made itself felt in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, was especially powerful in the territory of Kiev and Pereyaslavl. It shook the economic foundations upon which the authority of these towns was based, gradually wearing away the colonization which was afoot in the southern region. The countries of the north and north-east found themselves in a much more favourable condition in this respect. The Slav colonies in Finnish territory, situated on the Northern Volga, where a new race of mixed Slavs and Mongols from the east

* The origin of the word " Rusj " is not yet known. It is certain however that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and perhaps even earlier, this word was closely associated with Kiev and its territory.

sprang up—the Great Russians—became in the middle of the twelfth century, headed by the princes of the younger branch of the Kiev dynasty (the Pereyaslavl branch), a powerful principality, whose leaders, in the last half of the same century, made vigorous efforts to ruin the Kiev hegemony and to establish themselves on the ruins of this State. It was to this end that the dissensions which the history of the Ukrainian princes relates were encouraged ; the younger branch is made jealous of the Kiev princes, the commerce and the well-being of the nation grow less, and the esteem in which the metropolis is held disappears. These are the conditions under which the rivalry waxed between the new State of Great Russia, from which sprang later the principality of Moscow, and the Ukrainian metropolis, and to which was due in great measure the ruin of the political system of Kiev, which was already making itself felt at the beginning of the thirteenth century.

II

The Decadence of the Political Life of the Ukraine

The decadence of the State of Kiev does not by any means coincide with the ruin of the life of the Ukraine as a State. The princes of Tchernicov, whose possessions had been less damaged by the Turkish invasion than the countries of Kiev and Pereyaslavl, were the first to take up the part that the House of Kiev had played in the political life of the Ukraine. But these attempts were not successful, for the Mongolian invasion of 1239 which overflowed the territory of the Dniepr with tremendous vigour, soon deprived the principality of Tchernicov of its remaining independence. On the other hand the principality of Halitch-Volhynia which had sprung up at the end of the twelfth century (1199) through the reunion of the principality of Vladimir of Volhynia with the principality of Halitch, showed, in the hands of a descendant of the eldest branch of the House of Kiev, Prince Roman, a much greater aptitude for self-development and the acquisition of political importance.

Turkish pressure, even in the preceding centuries, had forced the migration of the Ukrainian population from the south towards the east, in the direction of Volhynia and the Carpathian district. The Mongolian invasion led by Batu Khan ended the migration to the west of the political and intellectual life of the Ukrainians of the Dniepr regions.

As soon as Prince Roman and his son Daniel had firmly estab-

lished themselves, they sought to make their influence felt in the eastern part of the Ukraine. These attempts came to naught, however, on encountering the resistance of the Golden Horde, who supported the Ukrainian towns in their combat against the princes' rule, and made every effort to prevent the development of the power of these sovereigns. The politics of the House of Halitch-Volhynia also came in conflict with the aims of Poland and Hungary. For some time these nations had been endeavouring to seize the western portion of the Ukraine. In vain did Daniel suggest forming an alliance against the Tartars. This proposal only met with the indifference of his western neighbours, and he was forced to abandon his great idea, which, however, brought him the royal crown presented by the Pope.

The State of Halitch-Volhynia lasted nearly another century and became the centre of the intellectual and political life of the Ukraine, with the exception of Eastern Ukraine, which remained untouched by its influence. This period of Ukrainian history is one of immense importance, for it was at this time that the Byzantine ideas (till now predominant) were neutralized by fresh influences coming from the west, especially from Germany. These influences gave birth to the system of town communes, modelled on German Law which sprang up in Halitch-Volhynia at the beginning of the thirteenth century. From this moment circumstances became more favourable for the development of Ukrainian culture. But the alliance between Poland and Hungary, through the treaty of 1336, was soon to put an end to the West Ukrainian State. The movement started in 1340 by the boyars of Halitch-Volhynia who, dissatisfied with the politics of Prince George Boleslas, tried to put in his stead Lubart, a prince of the Lithuanian dynasty—gave the kings of Poland and Hungary a pretext to march against the kingdom of Halitch. A bitter struggle began for the possession of the countries dependent on this kingdom and

eventually led to the annexation by Poland of the district of Halitch and Cholm, thus putting an end not only to the political independence of the country, but also ruining the power of the nobles (boyars) and rich townspeople and destroying the old social system of the Ukraine. The blow was the heavier because at that moment the kingdom of Halitch-Volhynia had become the last refuge of the national inheritance.

On the other hand, political and national life, under the leadership of Lubart, continued its course in Volhynia, which had defended itself from the Polish attacks. It was during the same century that the important principalities whose leaders were princes of the Lithuanian dynasty, *i.e.*, those of Kiev, Tchernicov-Hewer, Turov-Pinsk, in the Pripet district, took their rise in the regions of the Dniepr. Here continued the old social system, the legal traditions and the culture of the Kiev period, though in a less virile form, no doubt on account of the shocks they had undergone: here they continued to live or developed new lives. As a rule the ancient institutions, as well as the tradition of the Kiev period, were upheld by the Gedimin dynasty. The principle of Lithuanian politics was not to interfere with the national inheritance. Moreover, it often happened that the protectorate or suzerainty of this dynasty was accepted willingly, as in the case of Volhynia. *On ascending the throne of the principality they had conquered, the Lithuanian princes accepted the religion and nationality of their new subjects.* They protected the Church and the national traditions, and respected the ancient system and the legal institutions.

In this way the traditions of the political life of the Ukraine continued into the middle of the fifteenth century, with the exception of a few changes and interruptions, under the government of princes who were themselves subject to the suzerainty of the Grand Dukes of Lithuania. One must wait until the death of

Svitrihajlo, prince of Volhynia (died 1452), and of Simeon Olelkovich, prince of Kiev (died 1470) to see the central and eastern regions of the Ukraine definitely take their place among the ordinary provinces of the Principality of Lithuania. From this time, the Ukraine became subject to the immediate reaction of a social and political evolution, which following the ties drawn ever closer, of Lithuania and Poland, after the political union of these two States (1385) exerted about this time a most unfavourable influence upon the Ukrainian and White Russian element, as well as on its national interests and traditions. Thanks to the secular conservatism of the Lithuanian kingdom and to the principle of national autonomy on which the constitution of this State was founded, the new forms of a social order, based on Polish models, won ground much more slowly in the western territory, which was under the immediate domination of Poland. Among these latter let us mention Galicia, the district of Cholm, Podolia, in all of which Polish law was introduced in 1430. Even in Lithuania the Ukrainian element had the misfortune to watch all its institutions disappear as well as the social system which contained them.

About this time one can perceive in the Ukrainian aristocracy, under the Lithuanian regime, the signs of a strong opposition against the new course which political events were taking. For this evolution favouring solely the catholic and Lithuanian elements, entirely sacrificed at one and the same time the Ukrainians and the White Russians. The Ukrainian aristocracy also found itself quite excluded from the political life of the principality. In the same way as the Lithuanian-Polish element strengthened itself by the solidarity created by the common catholic faith, the Ukrainian aristocracy of that period sought help from its co-religionists of Muscovy. It was then that the conspiracy against Prince Olelkovich broke out ; he was deposed in 1481 by the Kiev

government ; also that against Prince Hlinsky (1507) ; and at this period the princes of Tchernicov, near to Moscow, passed over to Muscovy (1480-1500). At the same time the Ukrainian aristocracy calls in aid the Voivods of Moldavia. These explosions of Ukrainian irredentism did not succeed, however, in bringing to the people any durable amelioration of their condition. Muscovy contrived that all these events, coming as they did at a time when the orthodox religion was being oppressed, should serve her as a means of securing neighbouring regions ; she occupied the country of Tchernicov and the town of Smolensk, and prepared for the occupation of Kiev. The Ukrainians, undergoing as they were the Lithuanian domination, were unable to derive any advantage from the circumstances.

III

The Ukrainian Renaissance of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

About the middle of the sixteenth century Ukrainian life had lost much of its strength. The aristocracy, deprived of any participation in politics, was forced to submit to the paramount race, while the middle classes were subjected to every kind of vexation.

The peasant had lost the right to possess either house or land. He had become a serf. Numerous taxes weighed him down till he was a mere accessory of the earth. The orthodox church, which in those times was the representative of the nation, had become dependent upon a government as ill-disposed towards it as to the peasants. It underwent a crisis which nearly brought about its dissolution. Up to this period Lithuanian Ukraine had progressed slowly, but from the middle of the sixteenth century it progresses more rapidly under the influence of the Polish institutions. Moreover, about 1509, nearly all the districts of Lithuanian Ukraine were taken from its rule and simply annexed to the Polish republic. They were Volhynia, Eastern Podolia, Podlachje (the western Bug district) and Kyjever. The Polish aristocracy came in numbers to reside in its new territory, the Ukrainian aristocracy became influenced by the Poles and the individual life of the Ukraine ceases to exist.

This did not take place without a reaction and a desire for a

national renaissance. The movement appears first among the middle classes of Western Ukraine, who unite in guilds and try to reconstitute a social and intellectual life, to diminish the difficulties with which the Church was surrounded and to bring about an awakening and regeneration of the national conscience. At their head is the guild of Lemberg, reorganized in 1540, and again in 1586, under the patronage of the patriarchs of Constantinople.

Having regard to the special circumstances in Western Ukraine, where the aristocracy in particular had been nearly demolished, and where union with the Catholic Church (who brought forward a candidate for the bishopric), in 1596, had caused a great confusion, one will see that the intellectual and national regeneration could not hope to succeed in the long run. It found support, however, in a new social and political factor which at this critical moment appeared in Eastern Ukraine, that is to say the Cossacks.

The word "Cossack," borrowed from the Turco-Tartar language, is applied to the race which lived on the steppes by means of hunting and plunder. Their organization acquired considerable force in Eastern Ukraine, especially when the Tartar hordes from the Crimea had, at the end of the sixteenth century, reduced a considerable portion of the territory watered by the Dniepr to the state of a desert. This Ukrainian militia, growing ever bigger, created a regular guerrilla republic of the steppe in the second half of the sixteenth century, of which the portion called "Sitch" became the centre. This district was situated on one of the inaccessible and marshy islands of the Lower Dniepr, called "Porohy," from whence comes the name "Zaporogues of Sitch." From this place the Zaporogues extended their influence bit by bit over the Ukrainian population of the Lower Dniepr, until they became in time a military and political factor of no little importance.

The Cossacks did not hesitate to proclaim the immunity from all jurisdiction, all foreign suzerainty, all taxes and all personal

service of those who submitted to the power and jurisdiction of the Zaporogue army. Thus they drew towards them an enormous number of peasants, who at the end of the sixteenth century, were leaving Western and Northern Ukraine for the east in order to escape the heavy burdens of serfdom. *The Cossacks considered themselves an independent political power. They made treaties with neighbouring States, offered them their help and services, and at the same time posed as representing the national interests of the Ukrainian people.* For this reason they came into close contact with the remains of the aristocracy who were faithful to the national ideal and the Orthodox Church. This Church was re-established at Kiev between 1610-20, under the protection of the Cossacks. Schools and churches were found in the town, and the intense intellectual and national movement was transferred from Galicia to Kiev. About 1590 the Cossacks came into conflict with the Polish government, and their disagreements grew more serious as time went on. Fortune smiled now on the one, now on the other of the adversaries, but the end brought defeat for the Zaporogues and reprisals on the part of Poland against all who had participated in the movement. This setback and the consequences of it brought about amongst other things the emigration of the Cossacks and the Ukrainian peasantry, who rebelling against the serfdom imposed upon them, crossed the Muscovite frontier for the desert regions of the Don and Donetz. In the seventeenth century migrations again took place to this district; the Ukrainians re-establishing themselves in the provinces of Kharkov, Voronesch and Kursk (Slobodska Ukraine).

Moreover the social and political disturbances of Eastern Ukraine grew worse. Each struggle inspired fresh energy in the Ukrainians till at last prolonged reprisals (1638-47) led to a revolution. In 1648 the people rose, led by Bohdan Chmielnitzky.

This insurrection was caused by dissensions between the

Cossacks and the Polish government, dissensions which were not more serious than those which had preceded them. Circumstances, however, were favourable, the leader was talented, and the movement, contrary to all expectations, became of supreme importance. The Polish army was beaten, and the rising spread over the Ukraine, even to the distant regions of the west.

The demands of the insurgents exceeded all the traditional complaints which the Cossacks and the Orthodox Church were in the habit of making. *There had come to life a desire to free the entire people of the Ukraine within its ethnographical frontiers, to abolish the oppression of the Polish aristocracy and to reconstitute the ancient State of the Ukraine.* In spite of the number of insurgents, who totalled about 300,000 men at the beginning of the war in 1648, their leaders did not consider the liberation of the people possible by the means at their disposal. Chmielnitzky hesitated between two methods. The one, according to a pre-arranged plan of the Church dignitaries of Kiev, was to create a federation of the Orthodox States, Muscovy, Ukraine, Moldavia, and the Slavs of the Balkans. This alliance would have been directed against Poland and Turkey. Several reasons, and above all the weakness of the Turkish government, inclined Chmielnitzky to decide for Muscovy. For some time Muscovy had not dared to accept the Protectorate of the Ukraine. It feared war with Poland and remembered the cruel defeats which that nation had inflicted at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Not till 1653 did Moscow decide to extend its protection to the Cossack army and to the Ukraine by committing itself to war with Poland. *In March, 1654, the treaty was signed bearing the name "Articles of Bohdan Chmielnitzky," therein was defined the position of the Ukraine to Muscovy.*

These Articles were drawn up in haste, without going deeply into the problem, and many questions were left undecided. The

pourparlers which preceded the signing of the treaty showed at any rate that Chmielnitzky did not hesitate at any concession, provided that the Muscovites went to war with Poland. The uncertainty attaching to several points in the treaty explains why the theorists of political law, whether Ukrainian or Russian, have never been agreed as to the true nature of the juridical relations established between Muscovy and the Ukraine by the treaty of 1654. Some of them see in it the establishment of a theoretical union, some a real union. Many experts are of the opinion that the treaty made the Ukraine a vassal of Muscovy ; others on the contrary that it assured it a national autonomy on a broad basis. The most important clauses guarantee a free choice of "hetman," that is to say, the supreme head of the Ukrainian State, an office which was created under the protection of the Cossack army (1648-54), as well as the right to engage in diplomatic relations with other States, the complete independence of the tribunals, the choosing of a leader for the army of Ukrainian Cossacks over whom the hetman had supreme command, and lastly the independence of the Ukrainian Church.

The treaty on the other hand makes no mention of the part to be played by the Muscovite Government in the civil and economic administration of the Ukraine. It came to pass as a matter of fact that the organization of political and monetary affairs was left to the "hetman," but the Muscovite government refused to guarantee for the future the security of these administrative branches. Differences soon arose between the two countries on this point as on that of the autonomy of the Church. This the Muscovite government recognized in the treaty, but afterwards sought to suppress at all costs. Moreover, during the last years of the reign of Chmielnitzky, a complete rupture with Moscow was in course of preparation. The Ukrainian government counted on the help of Sweden, and soon tried to conclude a treaty whereby

this nation should promise help to the Ukraine. Furthermore, it was to guarantee the independence of the country and the integrity of its territory. *The Ukrainian men of affairs wished to bring it about that their country should rank as a neutral nation, under the protection of its neighbours.*

IV

The Struggle for Ukrainian Nationalism in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

The aspirations of the Ukrainian political leaders came into conflict with the course taken by the Muscovite government, to whom the Ukraine was bound by the treaty of 1654. Moscow held that the rights conferred by her on Chmielnitzky were only provisionary and that they were to be restricted little by little, till the moment came when the Ukraine would become merely a province of the Muscovite empire. On the other hand the men at the head of the Ukrainian government made every effort to maintain in its entirety the independence given to the administration of the hetmans, as it was in the time of Chmielnitzky. They endeavoured to fortify and protect it against any attack on the part of the Muscovite government. The right which the Moscow government assumed of controlling the choice of and unseating of the hetmans, of naming Muscovite voivods as military commandants even of Ukrainian towns, of levying taxes and of interfering with the autonomy of the Church were the chief points of disagreement. Moscow took advantage of all Ukrainian troubles and difficulties arising under the administration of the directors (the "Starchina," that is to say, the Elders) in order to restrict the liberties of the country. At the same time each of these attempts awakened in the Ukrainian government an ardent desire to safeguard the autonomy of the country

against such movements. Moreover, there was a central idea to their policy, which was to extend this autonomy to all the ethnographical regions of the Ukraine, or in other words, to place the entire nation under the suzerainty of the hetmans, whose rule in the time of Chmielnitzky extended to the Dniepr district.

At the outset the Ukraine hoped to gain the help of Sweden for this enterprise ; but this country soon called back its expedition against Poland and signed the peace in 1660. After these happenings, Hetman Vyhovsky, in order to shake off the yoke of Moscow, decided to make a treaty with Poland, whereby this kingdom should give to the Ukraine or to the " Principality of Rusj " autonomy on a broad basis, which should raise it to the rank of third member of the Polish Union, together with the Principality of Lithuania (Hadjatch Union, 1658).

The Ukrainian government issued a manifesto whereby it notified the European Powers of its rupture with Moscow, giving as reason the treaty with Poland brought about by the attempts of the Muscovite government to destroy the autonomy of the Ukraine, and to meddle in the local affairs of the country. The turn which Ukrainian politics had taken made a deep impression on Moscow which was now ready to give up its pretensions to administer local Ukrainian affairs and even to withdraw the voivods from Kiev. But it was not long before the worthlessness of the new treaty became apparent. Poland, now seriously weakened, was incapable of helping the hetman to any great extent. Moreover, the Ukrainian populace, fearing a return of the oppressive rule of Poland, were in no way anxious to re-establish relations with the new ally. Neither did Poland desire to stand loyally by the treaty to which she had just put her seal. She considered that the concessions made by the Hadjatch Union were excessive. The Ukrainians on the other hand found them insufficient, Vyhovsky was obliged to give up his post as hetman and his

successors returned to the former policy in their dealings with Moscow.

When this happened the "Starchina" tried to guarantee its autonomy against any intrusions from the Muscovite government. But this latter, cured of the doubts arising out of the treaty of Hadjatch, went back to its old programme. The events which came about during the administration of Vyhovsky had thrown light on the differences existing between the ruling class and that portion of the populace animated by liberal ideals. These folk disapproved of the efforts of the "Starchina" to become a privileged class, and from this time onward they watched its politics with suspicion. The Muscovite government did not fail to use this social rivalry for its own end, *i.e.*, to combat any Ukrainian aspirations towards a greater national autonomy. To bring about this end an agreement was entered upon with Poland, by the terms of which the Ukraine was to be divided between the two countries.

The treaty dated 1667 secured to Poland all the Ukraine west of the Dniepr, with the exception of Kiev and its environs, which were to remain under Muscovite rule.

This partition created great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians, who saw in it a breach of the former treaty and an attack on the vital interests of the land. The hatred of the people for Muscovite politics led to the serious rising of 1668, in which the whole of Eastern Ukraine rose as one man against the agents of the Muscovite government and massacred the garrisons they had placed in the country.

The hetman Dorochenko (1665-76) placed himself at the head of the partisans of autonomy, who had remained faithful to the old ideal of the union of all the Ukrainian territories in one Cossack State. The Poles and Muscovites, having become reconciled, he sought other alliances, especially with the princes of

Brandenburg, and gained eventually the help of the Turk. The Porte took the Ukraine under its protection as a vassal State, and promised assistance to reconquer the liberty up to the ethnographical frontiers, as far as Przemyśl and Sambor, and the banks of the Vistula and Niemen, even to Sievsk and Putivl. As a matter of fact, after the campaign of 1672, Poland was forced to renounce her claim in favour of Dorochenko to that part of the Ukraine bound by her old frontiers (Treaty of Bulchatch, 1672). A new campaign was in preparation for the following year in Eastern Ukraine to put an end to the pretensions of the Muscovite government. The abandonment of this plan gave Moscow time to recover from her hesitation. Moreover the Turkish army had behaved very badly on Ukrainian territory during the expedition of 1672, so that the people rose in mass and showed great opposition to the policy of Dorochenko. A general emigration of the whole people took place from the regions situated on the right bank of the Dniepr, and the population passed to the other side of the river.

Dorochenko lost his footing. His attempts to extract from the Muscovite government a few at least of the concessions he desired, failed. He was forced to surrender his title of hetman and the centralizing policy of Moscow was again victorious.

The autonomy of the Ukraine became further restricted; in particular the independence of the Church disappeared. The Muscovite dominion seemed to be definitely established.

It was only shaken by the wars of the north and the successes of Charles XII in Poland and Russia. The Ukraine still remembered the treaty signed with Charles X, predecessor of Charles XII, as well as her attempt to secure complete independence with the help of Sweden. These plans had not succeeded, but neither had the inception of them proved disastrous, as had been the case with so many of the other political alliances. The most fervent

partisans of autonomy sought to persuade the hetman of the period, the renowned Ivan Mazeppa, not to let so favourable an opportunity escape. But the old hetman hesitated, fearing to take a false step and he only took his place at the side of Charles XII when this latter entered Ukrainian territory (1708). It was too late; the Muscovite army had also invaded the country to such purpose that the hetman did not even manage to join the Swedish army with all his regiments. The population, held back by the strict measures taken against all those who had in any way participated in the rising, adopted an entirely passive attitude. It was soon apparent that the movement stood no chance of success, and many dignitaries returned to offer their allegiance to Peter the Great. After the defeat of Poltava, Mazeppa fled with Charles XII to Turkish territory, accompanied by the dignitaries and Cossacks who remained faithful to his flag. He was followed by the Zaporogues who had sided with Charles XII, under Hordianko, one of the most tenacious fighters for the cause of liberty. In 1710, after the death of Mazeppa, whose end had been hastened by these events, a constitutional act of some interest took place on the occasion of the election of a fresh hetman; this had regard to the power of the hetman and the part to be taken by the army in the administration of the country. The decree was not made law, for it was said that the newly-elected hetman, Philip Orlik, as well as the partisans of Mazeppa, would never return to the Ukraine. The help of Sweden and Turkey had not brought about any appreciable result, nor did the later attempts (1720-30) to win the help of the Powers for his cause have any better result. The only hope of the hetman, the Zaporogues of the Sitch, were never able to secure the repeal of the order of banishment pronounced against them. In 1734 they were compelled to place themselves again under Russian authority.

V

The End of Ukrainian Autonomy.

Even though the peasantry of the Ukraine and even the greater portion of the ruling classes, surprised by the troops of Peter the Great, had not taken part in the Mazeppa rising, this nationalist movement was construed by the adversaries of Ukrainian autonomy into something extraordinary and dangerous, and gave Peter the Great and his partisans the necessary pretext for abandoning the system of progressive restrictions taken up till then by the Muscovite government. From then on, there was a rapid and sudden disappearance of Ukrainian institutions. Until this time, that is to say until 1708, Moscow had controlled the election of a hetman, forbidding the army to depose their chief or to proceed to any new election without the knowledge of the Russian government. Moreover, the voivods and the Russian garrisons were stationed in the most important towns of Ukraine. The Ukrainian government was forbidden all diplomatic relations, and the ecclesiastical hierarchy was subordinate to the Patriarch of Moscow. The administration, the finances, the army, the elections and the nomination of public officials were, however, in theory considered the sole right of the Ukrainian government. The country was ruled by the hetman chosen by the army, and assisted by the military dignitaries. The military assembly, the highest authority of the government, plays no further part beyond that of electing the hetman. The public officials were chosen either by the army and the nobles, or by the hetman himself.

After Mazeppa was deposed, the Tsar Peter instituted a supervision over this autonomous administration which was exercised first through Russian residents, and then by a college of Muscovite officers through whose hands passed everything that came in or out of the hetman's chancellery. The Tsar then himself chose the Ukrainian commanders of the regiments quartered in the administrative districts into which the Ukraine was divided. The country was inundated with Russian troops, whom the population were forced to support by means of heavy taxes. Eventually, on the death of the hetman Skoropadsky in 1722 the Tsar completely suppressed the power of the hetmans. The opposition to these measures manifested by several high dignitaries of the hetman's administration, led to the arrest of the recalcitrants and to their imprisonment in fortresses. Indeed, after the death of the Tsar Peter, the Russian government came to the conclusion that its policy with regard to the Ukraine had been too severe. It was therefore thought necessary to attenuate in some measure the impression caused by the turn things had taken. Under the pressure of circumstances the Ukrainians were authorized in two cases to elect their own hetman, but even so it was really only a matter of investiture and not of free election. The considerable period during which the last hetman, Cyril Razumovsky, ruled, brought a little peace to the country and left the officials to govern in comparative freedom, thanks to the exceptional position which the hetman occupied with the Moscow authorities. Razumovsky was the brother of themorganatic husband of the Empress Elizabeth. The Ukrainian government employed this period of tranquillity in bringing order into its administration in conformity with its own interests, so as to put an end to the chaotic state in which the administration found itself after the reforms of the Muscovite government.

From the moment the Empress Catherine came to the throne

the days of the Ukrainian autonomy were, however, over. Using as a pretext the first suitable occasion—which was in fact a petition to confirm the hetmanship upon the Razumovskys in a hereditary character—Catherine caused Razumovsky to be deposed (1764), abolished the post of hetman and appointed a governor-general assisted by a college composed partly of Muscovite and partly of Ukrainian members.

This reform aroused a widespread discontent in the Ukraine. When the instructions were given to the deputies of the new legislative commission, all classes of Ukrainians rose in unison to demand the re-establishment of the hetmans and the enforcing of the “Articles of Bohdan Chmielnitzky” which constituted the foundations of the relations between the Ukraine and Muscovy, and which had not been abrogated by any valid legislation. This unanimity of the Ukrainian people, expressed in so unmistakable a fashion was not enough, however, to restrain Catherine in her resolve to put an end to the independence of the Ukraine and to convert it into an ordinary province of the Empire. In 1775 the “Zaporogues of the Sitch,” the last representatives of the ancient democratic traditions of the Cossacks, were taken by surprise and totally defeated.*

In 1780 the old administrative traditions of the time of the

* The Zaporogues again took refuge in Turkey, from whence some went to Hungary and settled in the “Banat.” The Russian government anxiously ordered the re-establishment of the Zaporogue army in 1784 and offered fresh territory to the Cossacks at the mouth of the river Kuban in the Caucasus. A large number of Zaporogues answered the call, and in 1790 the new “Army of the Black Sea,” was organized. This army still appears to maintain many Zaporogue traditions, although its character is quite different. As for the other Cossack bands of Russia, they have nothing in common with the Cossack army at the time of the hetmans.

hetmans were replaced by those of the Russian Empire. This brought about at the same time the disappearance of the military organization of the Cossacks on all the territory under the jurisdiction of the hetmans. Prior to this, reforms of the same character had been introduced in that part of the Ukraine known as "Slobodskaya," which possessed similar institutions to those of the Ukraine of the hetmans, even though from an administrative standpoint this territory was immediately dependent on the central government of the Empire. The protests of the population that were formulated in 1787 were never anything more than a dead letter.

In order to crush the opposition of the ruling classes, who were the most prominent politically, the Empress made use of a method frequent in Russian politics. This was to proclaim that the reforms undertaken were for the sole purpose of protecting the people from exploitation at the hands of the "Starchina."

This did not, however, prevent Catherine from subjecting the Ukraine to serfdom, in its most cruel form, in 1783, nor from abolishing such of their old liberties as the Ukrainian peasants still continued to enjoy.

Contemporaneous with these measures for the abolition of the political life of the Ukraine and the destruction of its national character, *earnest efforts were made to break down its intellectual independence.*

The college of Kiev (which later became an academy), which had flourished under the protection of the Cossacks and had risen to the highest rank in Ukrainian political life, was menaced with dissolution by the Muscovite government, which was only held back from its attempt by the fear of arousing too profound a discontent throughout the country. Moscow refused to grant the demands formulated later by the Ukrainians to transform this college into a university and to build another at Baturin,

the capital of the Ukraine at that time. This long-felt wish had been expressed in a general way at the Union of Hadjatch in 1658. The Moscow government preferred to deprive the population of the Ukraine of its high schools, so that the young people should frequent Russian schools. This measure had as its object, of course, the russianization of the country, and to this end it was further suggested that the Ukrainian government should encourage matrimonial alliances with the Muscovites in the upper classes.

The subordination of the Ukrainian Church to the Patriarch of Moscow plays an important part in the history of the oppression of the Ukrainian national idea. When one takes note of the close relations that existed at that time in the Ukraine between teaching, printing and literary production on the one hand and the Church on the other we see that the measure alluded to above inevitably subjected the entire intellectual life of the country to a vexatious clerical censorship in Moscow. To this end was published in 1720 the celebrated Ukase establishing in Kiev a special censor for the purpose of prohibiting the publication in Ukraine of any book other than those of a religious nature. The printing of the latter was only allowed when the matter was taken from old editions, tallying in every respect with the Muscovite editions, "so that no religious differences should arise and no special dialect should creep into the country." This decree sterilized at once the development of Ukrainian literature, which explains why from this moment until the end of the eighteenth century no work was printed in the Ukrainian language, or in the mixed language composed of Ukrainian and Slavo-ecclesiastic elements formerly used for works of literature. The Guild "Laura" of Kiev was not even able to obtain permission to edit a Ukrainian Bible, even though it was able to show that the Ukrainian population absolutely refused to use Muscovite Bibles.

It is convenient to observe here the severity with which the Russian government persecuted anything which might be a reminder of Ukrainian independence. Moscow did not hesitate in this respect before instigating the most cruel acts of violence against the most worthy and most distinguished people. It exercised an oppressive influence on the population, compelling it to restrain every sign of patriotic aspiration and forcing it in a general way to reduce its national life to a minimum. Consequently memories of the old national life grew fainter and fainter by reason of the russianizing imposed upon the superior classes.

The evil results of the submission of the Ukrainian Church of the hetmans to the Patriarch of Moscow were not limited to the national life of Eastern Ukraine. The hierarchal unity that existed between it and Eastern Ukraine suffered as a result and a definite schism arose between the two Churches. The outcome of this measure was consequently to widen further the intellectual, ecclesiastical and political divergences which already existed owing to the national frontiers and the different lines between Eastern and Western Ukraine. All this was no small help to the successful Polonizing schemes which on the one hand threatened the life of the peasantry of Western Ukraine, while in Eastern Ukraine the Russian element also gathered strength.

VI

The National Life of the Ukraine in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century

In 1772, when Poland was first divided up, Western Ukraine, now Eastern Galicia, became part of the Habsburg kingdom* in virtue of certain longstanding claims of the Hungarian crown to this country. Some years later, Bukovina (the present region), which formerly belonged to Moldavia, was added to it. This passing of Western Ukraine into the rule of Austria awoke a new national fervour in the country. The Austro-Hungarian government had but lately learnt—at the time of the movement against ecclesiastic union in Galicia—of the deplorable condition in which the Ukrainian population of Hungary found itself. Steps were taken to ameliorate the moral and material condition of the priests of the United Greek Church in Galicia and in Hungary. A particular importance attached to the United Church in this province during the eighteenth century, for it became transformed here into the Ukrainian National Church. The measures that were established by the Austro-Hungarian government had therefore far-reaching consequences; as had also the efforts it made to disseminate instruction among the urban and rural population,

* In view of repeated assertions in the Press it is not superfluous to insist upon the fact that Western Ukraine never belonged to Russia at any period until the occupation of 1915.—*Translator.*

together with the attempts to ameliorate the economic condition of the people. Insignificant as were in reality the reforms brought about, and fleeting as was the current of ruthenophil sentiment in the policy of the government, this attitude nevertheless created a deep impression upon the Ukrainian population, which once again enjoyed a sense of nationality and lost the feeling of despair with which it was stricken during the later years of Polish supremacy. Even after the Austrian government, under the influence of the Polish aristocracy, had characterized its Ukrainian policy by a strongly reactionary feeling, the energy of the national movement was not completely dissipated. Development of culture and of the national ideal were still apparent in the first half of the nineteenth century.

On the other hand the Ukrainian territory which had fallen to the share of Russian rule on the partition of Poland (Volhynia, Podolia, the land west of the Bug and that around Kiev) had no cause to look for any revival of nationalist aspirations. The rigour with which the Polish or Polonized aristocracy ruled the Ukrainian peasantry became now more merciless still, supported as the Poles were by the authority of Russia. The subordinate administrative officials were for the most part the docile servants of this aristocracy. Certain attempts to appeal to orthodox tendencies that were hostile to Poland, which had been made by the Russian government in order to protect the serfs of the Ukraine, were quite futile. Opposition to serfdom was treated as treason. *Everything which was not in the hands of the Polish aristocracy—education, Church or literature, in a word the intellectual life of the country—had to combat unscrupulous russophil tendencies.* The government even went to the length of forbidding in the Church all the national rites, including even the Slavo-ecclesiastic tongue, which was the matrix of the Ukrainian language. These circumstances explain why the signs

of a national revival first showed themselves in Eastern Ukraine, notwithstanding the russianizing it was undergoing.

The memories of the Ukrainian nation were still alive there. In spite of all the social advantages conferred by the Government on the ruling classes, at the time of the abolition of the constitutional rule of the hetmans, the intellectual aristocracy suffered much in spirit at the loss of national autonomy. The enthusiasts dreamed of a foreign intervention which should re-establish Ukrainian autonomy, if not its political independence. These projects were always concealed from the suspicious eye of the Russian administration. They were handed down by word of mouth and only came to light occasionally and then in an incomplete form. Thus the journey to Berlin made by one of the most eminent members of the Ukrainian aristocracy, Count Kapnist, who went thither in 1791 to communicate to the Prussian government the grievances of the Ukrainians, has only recently come to light. The ambassador spoke of the discontent aroused among the Cossacks by the suppression of their former privileges and of the great sorrows experienced by the Ukrainian people plunged into despair by the tyranny of the Russian government and Prince Potemkin. As a matter of fact the Ukrainians were anxious to know if they could count on the assistance of Prussia in the event of an uprising, but this kingdom returned to Kapnist only a vague and unsatisfactory reply. Ukraine then turned in the direction of France and invoked in turn her aid. Traces of these diplomatic adventures may be found still in the archives of the French government.

For a while it looked as though the old institutions of the hetman period were about to be re-established: the Tsar Paul, who strongly opposed the policy of his mother, gave evidence of a wish from the beginning of his reign to give new life to some of the old political liberties. It is said that it was the minister

Bezborodko, a Ukrainian patriot, who inspired his master with these designs. The reign of Paul was a short one, however, and his successor Alexander returned to the principles of Catherine and set up again in the Ukraine the organization established there by the Empress. Nothing remained to remind the people of the time of the hetmans save the civil law, applicable to this day in the governments of Tchernicov and Poltava, the country of the hetmans of old.

The longing to see the old constitution restored made itself manifest from time to time, especially on such occasions as the Russian government sought to recruit the Cossack militia in the Ukraine. This happened in 1812 and again during the Polish rising in 1831, on both of which occasions the authorities sought to blind the eyes of the people with various promises of ameliorative measures. During the Crimean War especially the enrolling of volunteers aroused intense excitement among the peasantry, in whom national aspirations were still vigorous. All expectations of this kind met only with disappointment, but they helped to keep alive the nationalist feeling among the Ukrainian people. The Russian government made a pretext of these aspirations for looking with even greater suspicion upon certain candidates for the hetmanship, as well as of frowning upon other real or imaginary manifestations of Ukrainian irredentism.

It was not only in matters of sentiment, but in political ideas as well that the tradition of the Cossacks tinged all memories of their heroic struggles for liberty, the idealized figures of their knights, and the freedom which continued to exist among the intellectual classes and in the poetry of the Ukraine, especially in the district of the Dniepr. The study of the past and of historic documents which were taken up with devotion by Ukrainian families in direct descent from the Cossacks, the collecting of popular traditions, which became numerous after 1820 or 1830—

all this brought back to mind the symbols of national heroism and was handed down from generation to generation as a sacred legacy from the past and a promise for the future.

The feeling of romantic affection for everything concerning the immigrants coming from Germany and the Slav countries of the West, took root among the educated classes of the Ukraine, especially about the year 1820. It strengthened the interest shown up till then for old traditions, ethnography and the language of the people, exerting a deep influence on the future development of the nationalist tendency. The study of ethnography and dialects, the researches into the life of the people, the renaissance of the Ukrainian language and literature, such as we see at the end of the eighteenth century and especially in the first half of the nineteenth century brought together the intellectual classes. This movement removed the lack of sympathy between nobles and people, which had been one of the causes of the political weakness of the Ukrainian upper classes, in addition to the national decadence and the russianization during the eighteenth century. The educated Ukrainians in the nineteenth century regarded the people as the guardians of the national culture, and of an art and genius full of unparalleled beauty. This recognition of the æsthetic value of the people slowly gave birth to a social and political democracy, founded on the sentiment of an ultimate alliance with the people which alone could be the foundation of Ukrainian regeneration.

On the other hand, the discovery of the inexhaustible genius of the people increased the intensity of the national ideal in the minds of the educated classes. *A people of such numerical strength, covering such a vast extent of land, which had kept its patriotism intact in spite of all the difficulties created by political and religious disintegration ; a nation which had maintained the fundamental purity of its language, its customs, traditions and*

poetry, which had founded such a remarkable material civilization : such a nation could not disappear, for it contains in itself the promise of its own resurrection. Such are the principles which make up the faith of educated Ukrainians as the tendencies we have endeavoured to point out develop. Profiting by the old mistakes the governing classes of the Ukraine assert their ideal from a firmer standpoint.

VII

The Development of the Ukrainian Ideal about the Middle of the Nineteenth Century

Under the influences of which we have just spoken, and thanks to the ideals imported from Western Europe, Ukrainian political thought abandoned its aspirations towards an independence that was no longer feasible, as well as to the establishment of a Cossack State, in order to replace them by a realizable political programme adapted to the existing circumstances. The oldest of these programmes that was in any way realized, dates from 1846. It was started by the Ukrainian organization of Kiev, known as the Guild of Cyril and Methodius, which played an important part in the course of later events. This body was organized at the beginning of the year 1846. It included the most eminent representatives of Ukrainian learning (the poet Shevtchenko, the ethnographer Kulich, the historian Kostomarov, the lawyer Hulak, etc.) and soon found many partisans. As one of them says, the number of members of the guild was raised to a hundred in the space of a year in the different towns of the Ukraine, and this in spite of the secret nature of the body. The guild aspired to a Slav Federation, an alliance between the "Slav republics" of which that of the Ukraine would be a member. They desired a democratic and liberal constitution which would abolish privileges and classes and everything in fact of a nature to debase the people. Absolute freedom of speech,

of thought, and of religion was to be guaranteed. Measures were to be taken to educate the people and to enlighten their political conscience. They counted on the creation of a popular literature to attain this end, on the bringing together of the upper classes and the people, and of working on the mind of the youth of the lycées and high schools so as to instil into them the ideas of confederation. Actually all this practical activity was killed at birth. For in the year 1847 one of the students informed on the leaders and denounced them, with the result that they were arrested and condemned. This repression put a stop to any development of political thought in the Ukraine, now that the most talented and active leaders were reduced to silence. When they returned from their exile and assumed their patriotic task, circumstances, such as the suppression of serfdom in Russia and the amelioration of the lot of the peasantry, compelled them to labour chiefly for the comfort of the peasants. They were occupied in teaching the agricultural classes and in educational work of various kinds as well as in creating a popular literature, etc. Yet this activity, though it was purely of an educative nature, was suppressed by the government, in conformity with the principle proclaimed by the Minister of the Interior Valujev in 1863: "The Ukrainian language," he said, "never has existed, does not exist, and must not exist." As soon as the reprisals became less severe, about 1870, the work began again. It was directed in particular by an organization established at Kiev and known by the name of "Hromada" containing the best representatives of the new generation in the Ukraine. As in the preceding period, its activity was concentrated chiefly in the direction of general culture, scientific researches, studies in history and ethnographical work. Moreover, efforts were made to develop the literature, the music and the theatre of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian ruling classes disapproved of the secret revolutionary

or terrorist associations which attracted towards them the greater part of the Ukrainian youth. They reproached them for their centralizing tendency, and their lack of interest in the national aspirations of the downtrodden peoples of Russia, especially those of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists preferred liberal-constitutional ideals and were broad-minded with regard to the question of national autonomy. They especially favoured the scientific and intellectual side of the Ukrainian movement.

In spite of such moderation in thought the Russian government regarded this activity with an unfavourable eye, because at the outset it hated any national Ukrainian movement, however moderate it might be. Moscow held strongly to the doctrine of "the unity of the Russian people," the complete unifying of the literary tongue, the schools and the general culture of all the Slav peoples of the East, whether inhabiting Ukraine, Great Russia or White Russia. Moreover, it regarded as dangerous any desire to establish a separate Ukrainian literature, any endeavour to awaken national feeling in this unfortunate race, and therefore any study which concerned its origin. Intellectual separatism was for it the first step which might lead to political separation between the two States. So whether it is intellectual or political, Ukrainian "separatism" is the scarecrow which dictates the movements of the Russian government with regard to Ukrainian aspirations.

For these several reasons then, the activities of the Ukrainians of Kiev were suppressed, no matter how modest or how politically innocent they might be. Any establishments or organizations where Ukrainian scientific workers congregated were forbidden and in the spring of 1876 the celebrated Ukase appeared determining the fate of the movement for many years. *This Ukase forbade the publishing in Ukrainian of any work other than those of an historical or literary nature.* It also required that Russian

spelling should be used while every work was to be censored. Conferences, theatrical representations or Ukrainian concerts were absolutely forbidden.

These limitations were in themselves sufficiently severe, yet their severity was augmented by the arbitrary interpretations of the censorship. So that not only was popular and scientific literature suppressed, according to the letter of the Ukase, but even the printing of any other work in the Ukrainian language, for only works lacking interest or importance were authorized for publication. This state of things lasted a long time, for the Ukase was not repealed till 1906. However, the order with regard to concerts and theatres was soon repealed, on the advice of the local authorities, who became convinced that the prohibition was foolish and only served to excite the people. Nevertheless, all artistic manifestations were very strictly supervised.

The Ukrainian movement, however, was not to be extinguished by such coercive measures. They served on the contrary to keep it alive by putting obstacles in the way of any attempt made by so-called "Ukrainophils" to adopt any loyal line of conduct. The Russian government did not approve of this attitude any more than of a radical one.

The impossibility of simply suppressing the Ukrainian movement was from now onwards demonstrated. It was to be explained by the political and intellectual force acquired by the nation during the nineteenth century. A lasting success had already been secured to it in the domain of literature and general culture. The movement had its footing on the masses in a nation of twenty million inhabitants (now nearly thirty-five million) holding to their nationality at any price, and showing an inexhaustible power of evolution, hitherto only held in check by the bonds of a reactionary regime.

The educated classes of the Ukraine fought incessantly in

Russia for the national movement from 1880 to 1900 and endeavoured to turn to their own advantage any possibilities which offered themselves. When the movement became no longer possible in Russia, it sought an outlet beyond the frontier in the territory of Austrian Ukraine.

VIII

The Contemporary Ukrainian Movement

The exodus of the Ukrainians or the divergence of the national activity towards Austrian Ukraine, towards Lemberg, which became a centre for the national life, was weighty with results not only for the Ukrainian movement in Russia, but also for the development of Austrian Ukraine itself. Already, about the year 1860, after the first prohibition of the Ukrainian language in Russia, this event had contributed to the sustenance of the Ukrainian national life in Austria at a very critical moment in the development of this section of the subject people. After the movement had gradually grown weaker in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, under the pressure of the general reactionary movement in Galicia, the storm year of 1848 poured a refreshing breath over the Ukrainians of Austria. The Austrian government sought in the Ukrainian population something to set off against the Polish revolutionary movement. The final liberation of the serfs, the admission of the moral and political rights of the Ukrainian people (or Ruthenians) the creation of the first institution of any importance in the domain of culture and politics, the nationalization of the schools, the formal promise of a university for Lemberg, the administrative separation of the two Galicias (Ukrainian and Polish) which had been artificially united in 1772 : all these influences assisted the birth of a new era in the life of the Austrian Ukraine.

But these years that were so full of hope soon passed, to be followed in their turn by the reaction of 1850, which brought to the Ukrainians of Galicia the most bitter deceptions. The promises made were completely forgotten for the most part, and the Ukrainians of Galicia, this "Tyrol of the East," after having aided the Austrian government in its combat against the rising of the Polish aristocracy were left to the unscrupulous rule of these same nobles, into whose hands the whole administration of Galicia passed once again in the year 1850. The Polish aristocracy and bureaucracy utilized the growing influence which they possessed for the purpose of insinuating to the Austrian rulers that the Ukrainian population of Galicia was an uncertain element, devoted to Russia and the orthodox faith. These intrigues were an obstacle to any attempts on the part of the Ukrainians to open the eyes of the government to the fatal consequences of a Polish predominancy in Galicia, under which the Ukrainians suffered horribly.

Thus arose a painful crisis in the national life of the Ukrainians of Galicia. Disillusions and doubts followed one another, and the way was open for the Russophil current towards which the Polish aristocracy was eagerly driving the Ukrainian element. Certain intelligences, despairing of any Ukrainian regeneration, turned to Russian culture in order to escape complete Polonization.

The arrival of fresh Ukrainian immigration, coming in 1863 to employ their activity on Galician soil, after the suppression of the Ukrainian movement in Russia, cannot under the circumstances be too highly appreciated. At a critical moment this influence brought the necessary aid to the Ukrainian element, chiefly of the younger generation—which had remained faithful to the programme of 1848. It helped them to strengthen their morale and to play their part in the life of Galicia.

From about 1880 this "popular" Ukrainian movement, as it

was called, took a firm hold of the people in Galicia, nor did it fail to keep in touch with the Ukrainian movement in Russia as well. It acquired considerable influence over the masses. This was especially so with the left wing of the movement which was the more radical part and originated in 1890. Moreover the close bond which, uniting Russian and Austrian Ukrainians, enabled the latter to utilize the resources of Galicia for their own development. The writers of Russian Ukraine took part in propaganda work and education in Galician Ukraine. From 1880 to 1905, that is to say for a quarter of a century, Galicia was, so to speak, a kind of intellectual Piedmont for the Ukrainian movement. Galician newspapers became the political tribune for the discussions and resolutions of the questions which were agitating the big Russian Ukraine and the small Austrian Ukraine. Galician educational establishments became the meeting places of the élite of both regions, who came together to combine their intellectual resources with the object of preserving their common patrimony.

One can easily understand that this movement, almost entirely banished from Russia, took up an irreconcilable attitude in regard to the centralizing policy of the Russian government. It was further equally intransigent in its hostility to the Polish oppression in Galicia. It goes without saying that the Russian government, always hostile to anything which would favour Ukrainian "separatism" in a broad sense, put a stop to any opportunism in the Ukrainian movement. *In Austria Polish supremacy raised an insuperable obstacle between the Ukrainians and the government*; any compromise with the latter was subject to the assent of the masters of Galicia, which meant, of course, the surrender of all Ukrainian aspirations. And as soon as one of the political leaders of Galicia showed any intention of making generous concessions, the Galician masses and the

radical Russian Ukrainians were not long before they exhibited a vigorous disapproval.

This is what happened in 1890, when some leaders tried to arrive at a compromise with the government. The Austrian and Russian Ukrainians united in offering such opposition to the plan that it could not be carried out.

The end of the century was signalized by a rapprochement between the two Ukraines. This had a most happy result for the national life, thanks to the reciprocal control exerted on political questions.

From this moment the progress of national culture in Russian Ukraine has made rapid progress, in spite of all attempts made to stop its course. The present time shows a remarkable development in the Ukraine which, benefiting by the enthusiasm of all classes, has reached a high state of culture, thus rendering service to the progress of national feeling. Ukrainian literature has produced a number of excellent writers. It has at last succeeded in securing the abrogation of the law which forbade the popularizing of scientific works. However, it was not until the advent of the new period which followed the Russo-Japanese war that the daily Press regained its liberty.

The stormy years 1904-6 brought to the fore the whole question of the Russian reactionary powers. The chief reform desired by the Ukrainian peasantry—the backbone of the Ukraine—was in the matter of agriculture. The educated classes concern themselves with the solution of political questions. With the spokesmen of other disinherited races they unite to give voice to the national grievances. Their first demand is for the repeal of the law forbidding the use of the Ukrainian language. *The Russian government has examined this question and found that the restrictions placed on the Ukrainian movement are quite unjustifiable.* In answer to a question from the government the southern uni-

versities and those of Russia have given a similar reply. The Petrograd Academy addressed a memorandum to the Russian government proving that the current conception that the Russian literary language (Great Russian) was employed by the whole of Russia, was false, and did not include the Little Russians (Ukrainians). In the most positive manner this memoir affirms the right of existence to the Ukrainian language and literature. In spite of this, the delay brought about in the progress of the language was not immediately dissipated; this only occurred in 1906 when the law concerning newspapers was repealed. This law did away with all restrictions in respect of special idioms, under which term the Ukrainian language was included.

From this time on the Ukraine was freed of its shackles and was enabled to found papers, associations and all kinds of organizations with a certain amount of freedom. The constitution of 1906, although it left many restrictions still in existence, enabled the Ukrainians to choose their representatives. As a consequence the first and even the second Duma contained an important fraction of deputies elected by Ukrainian peasantry; yet the short duration of these assemblies prevented the representatives from accomplishing anything of importance.

It looked at this period as if the most joyous future were in store for the Ukrainian movement in Russia. Influenced by the aspirations towards political liberty shown by their brethren, the Austrian Ukrainians also claimed universal suffrage. Galicia was moved by a stronger national impulse than it had ever known before. It was hoped that once " œcumenical " Ukraine achieved freedom in Russia its intellectual and political power would be strong enough to release its sister States from foreign hegemony. These hopes, however, were not realized. A new reactionary movement disappointed all hopes, and all the promises made

to the Russian people in 1905 and 1906 were completely forgotten. This blow was especially hard for Ukrainians. They suffered from the modifications introduced in the election laws, modifications which revoked the suffrage of the peasantry. At the same time the Ukraine lost its representation in the Duma. The promised liberties—freedom for the Press and for associations—have never come into force, and a strict censor is still kept over printed works, newspapers and associations in the country.

The Russian Senate, and also Stolypin in his celebrated circular, "Associations among members of subject nations speaking a foreign language," affirmed once more the old principle of the unity and indivisibility of the Russian people, and labelled as "dangerous separatism" all Ukrainian national activity, even in the domain of culture. There is certainly a strange contradiction in the fact that Ukrainians as members of an indivisible Russia are forbidden to use their own language, and that at the same time they are considered as "people of a foreign tongue" of the Empire, who must undergo restrictions for the benefit of "the Russian people."

The Ukrainian associations which were set on foot in former years were nearly all dissolved and the establishment of new ones was forbidden. The daily and periodical Press was subjected to intolerable administrative restrictions, so much so that it became impossible for it to reach the agricultural community. Anything which showed the slightest sympathy for the Ukrainian ideal was considered as a crime, and the most vigorous reprisals were taken against officials, employees, students, etc., suspected of nationalist sympathies. The Ukrainian movement in Russia was forced back to its old position.

Nor were the Austrian Ukrainians spared the most cruel disillusionments in their turn. They saw their chances of improving their condition disappear as the hope of a solution of the Ukrainian

problem in Russia faded away. The electoral reforms had proved inadequate and the new "Volksparlament" on which were set such great hopes appeared absolutely powerless either to solve the complicated problem of nationalities, or to reduce the general chaos to order. Polish domination lost none of its rigours. Moreover the government, not wishing to quarrel with the Poles, stipulated for a compromise between them before they would promise any amelioration in Ukrainian conditions. Under governmental pressure and in spite of the opposition of Ukrainian opinion, a compromise was brought about at the beginning of 1914, on the basis of a reform in the law concerning the elections to the Galician Landtag. This arrangement soon proved itself to be insecure.

Under the blow of the survival of the old aspirations and the disillusionments they had received there arose a party in the Ukraine who wished to attempt once again the fight for the independence of the country. Such hopes which are found in the associations of the nationalist youth at the end of the nineteenth century awoke once again with renewed energy in spite of the ill-luck which had always hitherto pursued them. But the majority of educated Ukrainians only see in such aspirations a Utopia whose realization would bring about a political cataclysm.

Since it has been shown that the position of the Russian Ukrainians has no attractions for their Austrian brethren, while on the other hand the lot of the Austrian Ukrainians governed by the Poles does not seem at all enviable to the Russian Ukrainians, the educated classes of both Ukraines have come to the conclusion that it is preferable to strive for a broad administrative autonomy suitable to both monarchies, without having recourse to extreme measures.*

* Moreover, many are of the opinion that an economic rupture with the metropolis would be a risky and dangerous undertaking.

But even this policy has met with many difficulties in Austria, combated as it has been by the groups of Polish leaders. The same has happened in Russia, where, without counting the government, the liberal educated classes, although in close contact with the élite of the Ukraine, were yet hostile to the idea of autonomy. It is only about 1913 and 1914 that one observes a change of opinion among the progressive parties in Russia. Then for the first time do the claims of the Ukraine seem worthy of any attention. Such liberal views characterize the well-known efforts made in the Duma of 1913-14 by the constitutionalists, the socialists and the labour party.

Such was the situation when, sooner than one expected, there broke over Europe the cataclysm from which one expects a radical transformation of the conditions of existence of many subordinate nations, and the solution of numerous problems. It is difficult to say whether it will solve the Ukrainian problem. Whatever may happen, those who have followed the development of this question know that if present events do not bring about a solution of it, or at least open the way to such a solution, it will remain a source of new convulsions, not less terrible than those of to-day. Let the statesmen say to themselves : The Ukrainian question will not be solved by ignoring it or by further oppression. It can only be solved by adopting a policy of active realization in regard to the two Ukraines.

MICHAELO HRUSHEVSKY

(Professor of History at the University of Lemberg).

APPENDIX.

Selected List of Publications dealing with the Ukraine
Question since the outbreak of War.

APPENDIX

LIST OF PRINCIPAL PUBLICATIONS DEALING WITH THE UKRAINE QUESTION SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

While this list does not claim to be either absolutely accurate or complete, the editor has attempted to tabulate all the articles which were either typical of many or of sufficient importance to the student. Articles dealing with purely military matters had perforce to be excluded. However incomplete this list may be it will be sufficient for the informed reader to look up all that is mentioned therein to realize how ill acquainted with the truth and yet how credulous even a London newspaper writer can be.

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VOLUMES :

" Nationality and the War "	Arnold J. Toynbee	..	Dent & Sons (522 pp.).
" The Ukraine "	Bedwin Sands	.. Enlarged reprint of an earlier edition.
" Russia and the Great War "	Gregor Alexinsky	..	Fisher Unwin.

LONGER ARTICLES IN REVIEWS :

July, 1915	" The Future of the Ruthenians "	..	Bedwin Sands	..	<i>British Review.</i>
" "	" Life in Eastern Galicia "	W. F. Bailey, C.B.	.. <i>Fortnightly Review.</i>

APPENDIX. SHORTER ARTICLES :

17/9/14	" The Fate of Eastern Galicia "	..	George Raffalovich	..	<i>New Age.</i>
24/9/14	" The Conquest of Galicia "	..	"	..	"
8/10/14	" The Darkest Russia Bogey "	..	"	..	"
24/10/14	" Eastern Galicia "	..	"	..	<i>The Queen (Illustrated).</i>
10/12/14	" The War : A Russian Plot ? "	..	"	..	<i>Labour Leader.</i>
17/12/14	"	..	"	..	"
17/12/14	" The War in Galicia "	..	"	..	<i>New Age.</i>
14/1/15	" The Ukraine and the Small Nations "	..	"	..	"
19/12/15	" The Uniat Church of Galicia "	..	"	..	<i>The Universe.</i>
14/9/14	" The Cossacks "	Barnes Steveni	..	<i>Daily Despatch.</i>
18/9/14	" The Capture of Lemberg "	<i>Daily Telegraph.</i>
31/8/14	" Two Nations in East Europe "	<i>Daily Chronicle.</i>
30/7/14	"	<i>The Times.</i>
18/12/14	" Russia and the Catholic Church "	<i>Catholic Times.</i>
1/10/14	" The Darkest Russia Bogey "	..	Geoffrey Dennis	..	<i>New Age.</i>
25/7/14	" Teaching the Ruthenians "	..	" S. "	<i>Canada.</i>
13/10/14	" Racial Problems "	..	George Trevelyan	..	<i>Daily Chronicle.</i>
14/11/14	" Winnipeg's Ukrainians "	..	Florence R. Livesay	..	<i>Canada.</i>
10/12/14	" The Burglar "	Vasil Stefanik	..	<i>New Age.</i> Trans. by G. R.
12/12/14	" The Great Coming Settlement "	..	A Pole	<i>Outlook.</i>
31/12/14	" The Literature of the Ukraine "	..	Vasil Levitzky	..	<i>New Age.</i> Trans. by P. Sel-
31/12/14	" The Ironic Spirit in Russia "	..	Rosalind Travers	..	<i>Justice.</i> [ver.
			Hyndman.		
14/1/15	" Russia and Bukovina "	"	..	"
26/2/15	" In Bukovina "	..	"	..	<i>Manchester Guardian.</i>

APPENDIX. SHORTER ARTICLES—continued.

3/5/15	" The Carpathians "	Rosalind Travers .. Hyndman.	Manchester Guardian.
15/7/15	" Lemberg "	"	"
27/10/14	" The Slav Question in Austria "	Raseur	The 'Varsity.
19/1/15	" Galicia in 1914 "	"	"
26/1/15	" "	"	"
9/2/15	" "	"	"
16/2/15	" "	"	"
23/2/15	" "	"	"
2/3/15	" "	"	"
9/3/15	" "	"	"
27/4/15	" "	"	"
11/5/15	" "	"	"
18/5/15	" "	"	"
25/5/15	" "	"	"
1/6/15	" "	"	"
8/6/15	" "	"	"
28/1/15	" We cannot be Silent "	"	Labour Leader.
28/1/15	" How Russia treats her Refugees "	"	"
17/2/15	" Russia and Us "	"	Globe.
16/2/15	" The Russians in Czernovitz "	"	Liverpool Post.
3/3/15	" The Church in Galicia "	"	Catholic Herald.
3/3/15	" Vicissitudes of Czernovitz "	"	Morning Post.
4/6/15	" Poor Przemyśl "	"	Daily Mail.
9/6/15	" On the Battlefield of Galicia "	"	Manchester Guardian.

APPENDIX. SHORTER ARTICLES—continued.

21/1/15	" Russian Culture "	P. Selver	<i>New Age</i> .
28/1/15	" Partial Truth about the Slavs "	"	"
11/3/15	" Classification of the Slavs "	"	"
21/1/15	" Our Eastern Ally "	<i>Christian World</i> .
21/1/15	" Battle on the Oilfields "	<i>Star</i> .
13/3/15	" Notes from Russia "	<i>Westminster Gazette</i> .
20/1/15	" The New Map "	<i>Glasgow Herald</i> .
7/2/15	" Austria's Peace Terms "	<i>Sunday Chronicle</i> .
8/2/15	" Russia and the Ukraine "	Joseph King, M.P.	Three Questions in House of
12/2/15	" Where Three Empires Meet "	M. H. Donohoe	<i>Daily Chronicle</i> . [Commons
29/1/15	" The Archbishop of Lemberg "	Correspondence	<i>Universe</i> .
5/2/15	" " " "	"	"
12/2/15	" " " "	"	"
26/2/15	" The Uniat Church of Galicia "	"	"
5/3/15	" " " "	"	"
12/3/15	" " " "	"	"
14/2/15	" The Battle Ground of Galicia "	Sergius	<i>Sunday Times</i> .
18/2/15	" Nationalism," etc.	Le Vin	<i>Justice</i> .
3/3/15	" Archbishop of Lemberg "	Mr. Ginnell, M.P.	Questions in House of Com-
10/3/15	" " " "	"	[mons.
11/3/15	" Nationality and the War "	H. N. Brailsford	<i>Labour Leader</i> .
23/3/15	" Galician Oilfields "	<i>Financial Times</i> .
1/4/15	" Zapovit " " "	T. Shevchenko	<i>New Age</i> (Trans .P. Selver).
8/4/15	" In the Russian Duma "	"	<i>Justice</i> .
13/4/15	" Galician Refugees "	"	<i>Morning Post</i> .

APPENDIX. SHORTER ARTICLES—continued.

16/4/15	" Przemysl after the Fall "	<i>The Times.</i>
28/4/15	" The Transition of Lvov "	Harold Williams	..	<i>Daily Chronicle.</i>
26/5/15	" Through Galicia "	" "	..	" "
8/5/15	" A Polish People "	Weyland Keen	..	<i>Spectator.</i>
26/9/14	" Russians in Galicia "	C. Ua S.	..	<i>Irish Volunteer.</i>
17/6/15	" The Present State of Galicia "	M. Phillips Price	..	<i>Economist.</i>
24/6/15	" Letter from Russia "	C. E. Bechöfer	..	<i>New Age.</i>
1/7/15	" " "	" "	..	" (On Shevchenko's
5/6/15	" Galicia's Vanishing Church "	<i>Lieriary Digest.</i> [Grave.
30/6/15	" Eastern Galicia "	<i>Irish Times.</i>
28/6/15	" The Russians in Galicia "	Robert McCormack	..	<i>The Times.</i>
22/6/15	" About Lemberg "	H. Julian Fuller	..	<i>Evening News.</i>
3/7/15	" Notes on Galicia "	<i>Nation.</i>
7/7/15	" Russian Denial "	<i>Globe.</i>
16/7/15	" Austrian Regiments of Russians "	" "
17/7/15	" Life in Galician War Zone "	John Foster Fraser	..	<i>Standard.</i>

1st no./7/15 *La Revue Ukrainienne* (in French)
L'Ukraine

.. Pub. monthly in Lausanne, 2/- a copy.
 .. Intermittent. Lausanne.

The Ukraine (British) Committee

LONDON,

1914-15.

The members intend to study the Ukrainian question with an unbiased mind, to further knowledge of its problems, to inform one another through the Secretary of their historical, artistic and literary discoveries, to write or speak on the subject whenever possible, to bring the Ukrainian and the British nations into closer touch, to bring their influence as readers or subscribers to periodicals to bear upon Editors, in order that they may be forced to recognize the value of the claims of the Ukraine, and the unconscious insult to 37,000,000 people contained in the appellation *Little Russians* and *Malorussians*, or even *Ruthenians*, which in England and America alone they still persist in using.

No Subscription or Entrance Fee is required ; no public or private appeal is made for funds. Members who wish to contribute to the work of the Committee can do so by arranging with the Hon. Secretary for publication of literature concerning the Ukraine at popular prices.

The membership of the Ukraine Committee is drawn from every part of the British Empire. Non-British Ukrainian members are not accepted. This excludes the possibility of friction and ensures an absolute free hand for the members of the Committee. The Committee, however, will always welcome co-operation from the Ukraine. Although the membership is increasing rapidly, no names shall be published until a meeting has been called to consider both this question and that of extending the appeal for members to U.S.A. and to all parts of the English-speaking world.

TO MR. GEORGE RAFFALOVICH, *Hon. Secretary*,
22, Church Road, Barnes, Surrey, England.

I,

of wish to become a
member of the Ukraine Committee.

Signature

Date

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